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COMMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAPERS PRESENTED BY
WEILER, GOEBEL, AND MEYERS & LEVIE
George A. Bermann*

The preceding papers amply demonstrate that an important step in the
progressive integration of the European Union can be a compelling one without
being an easy one. The transition to economic and monetary union (EMU) in
Europe is precisely such a step. In this brief comment, I hope merely to show
that, however powerful may be the case for economic and monetary union,
passage to it is both generating institutional misgivings and entailing what could
be institutional mistakes.
1. The Economic Case for a Common Currency
I begin with the case for economic and monetary union, which I consider to
be a very strong one indeed. Not many initiatives remain to be taken in the
European Union that serve as many purposes lying so close to the heart of the
European enterprise. In the first place, although one frequently reads that the
"transaction costs" associated with multiple currencies have been exaggerated,
the fact remains that those costs are not negligible and are in any event quite
conspicuous. By definition, the more the single market succeeds, the more crossborder transactions there will be, with transaction costs commensurately
increasing.
Secondly, however well or poorly they may be held in check, currency
fluctuations generate a degree of uncertainty in economic transactions that a
truly integrated economy cannot afford and would not tolerate. It is difficult to
quantify the overall economic cost of this uncertainty, but it likewise cannot be
inconsiderable. Then, too, the coexistence of relatively stronger and weaker
national currencies is undesirable from the point of view of the "level playing
field" (a consideration that lies at the very heart of the integration enterprise), if
only because of the short-term trade advantages that accrue to the. state having
the weaker currency. Price discrimination is the inevitable, if unintended,
consequence.
No less important is the effect of multiple currencies on market transparency.
Quite obviously, this "cost" is no more easily quantifiable than any of the
others that I have mentioned, but it too is real. Consumers are clearly dissuaded
from purchasing in markets whose currencies they cannot readily evaluate, and
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they may run the risk of acting inefficiently. I believe that traders too can be
dissuaded from doing business in such markets and can thus be led to act
inefficiently.
More generally, the more that currency recedes as a factor in the planning of
economic transactions, the more market actors of all stripes can attend to other
considerations-efficiency, quality, and regulatory superiority, for example--that
deserve to be accounted for in such planning. In this respect, a single currency
can promote the values of subsidiarity-values with which it is actually seldom
seen as having a connection-since actors, if they are not systematically driven
by currency considerations, will have easier and fuller access to the different
regulatory regimes that subsidiarity allows to develop.
Significantly, none of the arguments I have advanced requires proof that a
single currency-like a single passport, flag or national anthem--will strengthen
the sense of a common European identity upon which closer political union may
in turn be built. If dealing on a daily basis in the same currency with which
other Europeans deal contributes to the strengthening of that identity, so much
the better. But the case for a common currency does not depend on that.
This is not to suggest that the economic case for a common currency is a
wholly and unreservedly positive one. Later papers in this colloquium will
doubtless explore its economic risks, such as they are. Mention has already been
made of the risk of "asymmetric economic shocks" which can be expected
within an economic and monetary union when the underlying macroeconomic
conditions are not in fact as closely aligned as they should be. As has been
observed, the existence of a common currency excludes any possibility of

national currency devaluation, the best-known country-specific remedial measure
traditionally relied on in the face of such asymmetric shocks. All that means,
however, is that an economic and monetary union must develop surrogate
mechanisms for dealing with such shocks-if only in the form of systems of
economic aid in favor of adversely affected regions.
2.

Technical and Legal Aspects

While the papers in this panel do not dwell on the basic economic rationales
for a common currency that I have just set out, they certainly demonstrate that
the European Union has the legal and technical wherewithal for organizing the
intended transition. However else it may be described, the timetable for
transition that earlier speakers on this panel have described is technically and
legally impressive. Having studied it, one cannot help concluding that, if there is
sufficient economic convergence and political will, the operation will take place,
and effectively. It is not surprising that, having in the past so frequently tackled
what were considered to be intractable legislative problems (including the
harmonization of quite disparate national laws), the institutions of the Union
have shown themselves capable of devising solutions to such problems as the
"rounding" of national currencies in the conversion process and ensuring the
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legal "continuity" of contracts.' In short, the economic case for moving to a
common currency has its counterpart in the legal and technical feasibility of the
move.
3. Beyond a Common Currency: The EMU
Even to begin appreciating the reasons for misgivings over what would appear
to be an inexorable next step in European Union integration, one must
appreciate that economic and monetary union means something more than a
common currency---and that it is that "something more" that is proving to be
problematic. Previous speakers have assumed, and subsequent speakers are likely
to show, that introducing a common currency entails profound institutional
changes for the European Union.
While there has been debate over the shape and, above all, the degree of
political independence of the future European Central Bank (ECB), there has
never been serious doubt that such an institution would have to be created and
that it would have to enjoy considerable political independence. Moreover, that
institution would have to exercise this independence over matters that have until
now-notwithstanding the EC Treaty's traditional exhortations in favor of
"coordinating" Member State policies-rested firmly in the hands of national
political leadership. Despite their centrality to the well-being of the European
economy (which after all is the central subject matter of the European Union),
prevailing policies on interest rates, money supply, price stability, unemployment
and government spending have, for all practical purposes, been Member State
policies. As evidence of that, national political campaigns continued to be
waged, and elections won and lost, on the basis of these issues, the unstated
premise being that national political authorities would continue to be responsible
for the relevant policies. When the Maastricht Treaty (and protocols) articulated
the convergence criteria that national economies would have to meet in order to
qualify for economic and monetary union, 2 it rudely shook this assumption.
4. Defining an Economic and Monetary Policy
Not many polities define an economic and monetary policy in their
constitutive documents. But the European Union has done so, and it is easy to
see why. In an economy as nationally and regionally differentiated as the EU,
the constituent units are naturally averse to leaving macroeconomic
policymaking to the unguided wisdom and discretion of distant macroeconomic
architects. Even if those architects were not to be politically independent, it is
hard to see how each individual state or region could expect them to be
responsive predominantly to it.
I See Council Regulation 1103/97 of June 17, 1992, on certain provisions relating to the
introduction of the euro ("Regulation 235"), 1997 OJ. (L 162)1.
2 Treaty Establishing the European Community [EC Treatyl, arts. 104c(2), 109j(1); Protocol to the
Treaty on European Union [TEU] on the excessive deficit procedure; Protocol to the TEU on the
convergence criteria referred to in Article 109j of the EC Treaty.
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Economic and monetary policy is explicitly defined in the Treaty in terms of
price stability, 3 and the convergence criteria (in particular, the prohibition on
excessive government spending) and the control mechanisms contained in the
subsequently adopted "Stability Pact ' 4 strongly reinforce this definition. With
such a definition, Europeans see that they are not merely heading toward a
common currency (with its relatively manageable legal and technical
implications), but toward a particular set of macroeconomic values whose
realization may entail profound social and economic consequences for the
Member State or region in which they live and in terms of which they continue
to think. The tension is most obviously seen in the interplay between pursuing
price stability (through restrictions on government spending), on the one hand,
and addressing the problem of unemployment on the other (a problem acute
enough to have caused the drafters of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty to make
employment the only new substantive chapter of the EC Treaty).5 But economic
and monetary policy is not limited to that.
To put the matter differently, if, as I have suggested above, the introduction of
a common currency does no violence to the values of subsidiarity (and possibly
even promotes them), the same simply cannot be said of the introduction of a
centrally determined economic and monetary policy. The tension might be
relieved by reducing somewhat the ECB's political independence, but, for the
reasons indicated above, it simply cannot be eliminated. The fact remains that,
for perfectly understandable reasons, Europe faces not only a common currency,
but a defined economic and monetary policy that has now been inscribed in the
Treaty and related instruments. Furthermore, this policy agenda will be pursued
by an institution whose political accountability cannot possibly be made
commensurate with the importance its policies will have for the diverse
economies within Europe. While the EC Treaty has always been an economic
constitution, its working principles have traditionally been cast in terms of free
movement and nondiscrimination, not in terms of particular substantive
conception of economic wisdom.
5. The Prospect of Sanctions
Among the ironies to be observed is that, while the European Community law
system has never been one to energetically sanction a Member State's noncompliance with its legal obligations, the new monetary and economic policy to
3 EC Treaty, art. 105(1) states that "The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the
objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2."
4 Through the "Stability Pact," the Member States agreed on a surveillance procedure for
monitoring their progress toward compliance with the convergence criteria, (see supra note 2, at 5),
and a system for implementing the TEU's excessive deficit procedure, including sanctions. See infra,
notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
3 Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty on European Union, the European Community and
other related documents, Oct. 2, 1997 (not yet ratified), adding to the EC Treaty a new Title Via
(arts. 109n-109s) on employment, 1997 O.J. (C 340).
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which I have just referred stands to be seriously enforced. It is only through the
Maastricht Treaty that Article 171 of the EC Treaty was amended to introduce
the prospect of imposing sanctions on Member States. Even then, sanctions can
only be imposed by the European Court of Justice (upon application by the
Commission), and only if the Court finds a Member State to have inexcusably
failed to comply with a prior ruling of the Court finding the state in inexcusable
breach of a European Community law obligation. This provision has yet to be
applied.
Yet, acting pursuant to Articles 103 and 104c of the EC Treaty, the Council
has now enacted a pair of regulations instituting a "multilateral surveillance
'7
procedure"16 and implementing the Treaty's "excessive deficit procedure,"
which promise to impose serious sanctions: mandatory non-interest-bearing
deposits of currency by offending Member States and eventually outright
Member State fines. It is not surprising that the drafters of the Amsterdam
Treaty considered it advisable at the same time also to introduce a system of
sanctions against Member States (and, upon their accession, future Member
States) for "serious and persistent breach" of such principles as "the principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
the rule of law."
6.

"Ins" and "Outs"

Given the heightened stakes of economic and monetary union, the EU now
also faces the prospect of a system of "ins" and "outs" on a grand scale. The
assumption up until now has been that those Member States that remained
"outside" a given regime--be it the Social Protocol, the common foreign and
security policy, or the Schengen Agreement-had chosen to do so. In the EMU
context, while much attention has been paid to Britain's, Denmark's and, more
recently, Sweden's decisions to place themselves provisionally among the
"outs," they too largely chose to remain outside the monetary union. The fact
remains, however, that the EMU has obvious prospects for involuntary outsiders,
not only among current Member States (such as Greece), but also among
prospective new members. To a large extent, whether they lie outside the EMU
lies outside their control, and may do so for an extended period of time. So
automatic and preordained is this species of non-membership, and so serious are
its consequences, that it should not even be considered in the same breath as the
cautious and elaborate provisions on "enhanced cooperation" that the drafters at
Amsterdam devised for inclusion in the EC Treaty and the TEU. 9
6 Council Regulation 1466/97 of July 7, 1997, on the strengthening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1.
Council Regulation 1467/97 of July 7, 1997, on speeding up and clarifying the implementation
of the excessive deficit procedure, 1997 O.J (L 209) 6.
9 Treaty of Amsterdam, adding a new Article F.1 to the TEU.
ITeaty of Amsterdam, adding a new Article 5.1 to the EC Treaty and new Articles K.15 through
K.17 to the TEU.
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I have sought in these remarks to show that there is no simple relationship
between the economic logic of a step on the road to integration and the
institutional consequences of taking it. That a clearly sound (albeit complicated)
step may have dramatic institutional consequences does not of course mean that
the step should not be taken-far from it. It suggests only that those
consequences need to be considered at the time the step is fashioned.

